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Revenue Maximisation - An Examination of the Influence of Heuristics and Biases 
on the Yield Management Decision Process in Dublin Hotels 
 
Abstract  
 
Yield management in hotels has been described as a method of profitably managing fixed room 
capacity.  A critical element of yield management is the decision strategy employed, as this 
determines the degree to which optimum financial solutions are generated.  Recent research has 
indicated that the use of technology assisted decision optimising models, specifically the 
management science model of decision making, would greatly improve decision optimisation, by 
minimising the need to employ guesswork in achieving financial goals.   
 
However, despite this assurance, yield management remains couched in uncertainty through 
being inextricably associated with forecasting future demand for a perishable product in an 
increasingly volatile and competitive environment.  The consequential pressures on decision-
makers have afforded the opportunity for human idiosyncrasies to play a significant role in the 
decision-making process.  The primary objective of this paper is, therefore, to gain an insight 
into how decisions are constructed in the yield management environment of Dublin hotels.   
 
The study reviews current literature on management science as a decision-making option. It also 
assesses heuristics and biases associated with decision-making, and their influence on rational 
decision protocol.   
 
The methodology employed phenomenological and hermeneutical techniques, with discourse 
analysis, in accessing and analysing data. 
 
The research findings reveal that within Dublin hotels, the management science model of 
decision-making has been sidelined in favour of decision strategies, wherein “human 
intervention” plays a more significant role.  The findings also suggest that this “human 
intervention” has subconsciously facilitated an environment for decision-makers to fall into 
psychological traps, with the potential to make systematically biased errors, through satisfaction  
of ego needs and rationalising the irrational. 
 
 
Introduction 
Yield management, in the hotel industry, is defined as a method of profitably managing 
fixed room capacity (Lieberman, 2003), involving “an integrated, continuous and 
systematic approach to maximising revenue” (Jauncey, Mitchell, and Slammet, 1995).   
This approach fundamentally requires hotels to make decisions on the number of rooms 
that should be allocated at differentially prescribed rates to segmented markets, within 
an ever narrowing time frame (Kimes and Chase, 1998; Kimes, 1989).   
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However, this decision process is neither clinical nor simple.  Intensive growth in 
business competition, acute price sensitivity of customers and increasing pressure from 
shareholders has intensified the need for hoteliers to maximise revenue.  These factors, 
when coupled with increasing time and data overload pressures on managers, have 
resulted in high levels of decision uncertainty, wherein computerised yield management 
systems are often promoted as a rational solution to the problem of maximising revenue 
generation, in an increasingly hostile marketplace (Upchurch, Ellis and Seo, 2002; 
Johns, 2000).   
In order to achieve revenue maximisation, hotels often need to strike a fine balance 
between being competitive, through cost reduction, and satisfying shareholder utility, 
through maximising revenue.  This balance, according to Cross (1997), is achievable 
through the application of disciplined tactics that predict consumer behaviour at the 
micro market level.   
However, although the above apparent complex mix of decision variables often appears 
“manageable”, it can promote a fear of, or an inability to examine all possible 
alternatives.  This in turn, may drive the decision maker into psychological traps, 
characterised by the “comfort zone” of familiar patterns of recognition (Shefrin, 2007; 
McKenna and Martin-Smith, 2005; Bazerman, 2004; Slovic, Finnucane, Peters and 
MacGregor, 2002; Klein, Orasnu, Calderwood and Zsambok, 1993).   
 
Within the hotel industry, dynamic combinations of price and room availability 
continuously alter the yield management decision environment, making the optimum 
solution a moving target for the decision maker.  Therefore, from a decision-making 
perspective, the seamless updating of room price and room availability is critical in 
minimising the risk of selling rooms at a sub-optimised rate (Sanchez and Satir 2005; 
Upchurch et al 2002; Johns, 2000; Kimes, 1997).  This would suggest that the complex 
mix of variables should invite the assistance of a rational based solution to the decision 
problem.  Indeed, research argues that mathematical models of decision-making will 
help take the guesswork out of the room management decision process by statistically 
improving the capability of delivering optimum revenue generating solutions (Sanchez 
and Satir, 2005; Lieberman, 2003; Kimes, 1997; Orkin, 1988;).   
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However, despite the assurances offered by unemotional decision processes, the diffuse 
yield management decision environment is complicated by human factors associated 
with the seductive influences of heuristics and biases.  Helliar, Power and Sinclair 
(2005); in agreeing with Herbig, Milewicz and Golden (1993), argue that pressures 
associated with forecasting may lead to practitioners becoming vulnerable to subjective 
biases and fears that negatively impact on the accuracy of the forecast, and suggest that 
Baysean assignment of judgement probabilities should be utilised to eliminate that 
pressure. 
 
Specific human idiosyncrasies that influence decision behaviour within the yield 
management process are outlined by Yeoman and Ingold (2000).   Examples of these 
idiosyncrasies include; ethical concerns about overbooking (concern for the customer 
outweighing a requirement for profit maximisation), pressure to achieve budgeted 
targets, and personal pressures associated with performance-linked incentive payments.  
This appears to suggest that while the internet has become a preferred booking conduit 
for many travellers, it may be perceived as a poisoned chalice for the incentivised 
decision-maker.  Indeed, despite recent research suggesting that transferring a 
substantial amount of room booking activity to the internet will guarantee significant 
competitive advantage and generate higher revenues (Marmorstein, Rossomme, and 
Sarel, 2003; Noone and Andrews, 1999), the majority of hotels have not attempted to 
sophisticate their yield management techniques.  Instead they have resorted to 
indiscriminate price structuring, based on simplistic timing rules that avoid 
communication and data analysis.   This reluctance to embrace internet technology has 
been identified by Yeoman and Ingold (2000), who hypothesize that many hotels still 
input information based on historical demand associated with particular customer market 
segments, attributable to specific times of the year, rather than using a dynamic pricing 
strategy, such as that offered by a computerised yield management system.   
 
Other human idiosyncrasies, namely, the avoidance of internal conflict, through the 
individual’s need to satisfy the group decision goal and career promotion issues, may 
also influence decision behaviour.  Additionally, a greater weighting being given to 
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qualitative thinking over quantitative thinking may impact on the eventual decision 
outcome, through the promotion of solutions that are made to appear “acceptable” via 
practitioner value biases and delusions of success (Shefrin 2007; Helliar, Power and 
Sinclair, 2005; Sloman, 2002; Tversky, Sattath and Slovic, 1988).   
 
So, where the option exists to use cold logic in formulating the yield management 
decision, or to follow heuristical pathways, which one wins?  In the process of decision-
making, a tension can exist between immediate intuition and a more measured rational 
belief.  This tension is often exemplified by an evaluative or non evaluative comparison 
between emotion laden heuristics on the one hand, and a coherent justifiable set of data 
or beliefs on the other.  Within this tension, decision-makers can be torn between 
decisions that they personally resonate towards (associative thinking), and decisions that 
they find analytically more accurate (rule based thinking).  Sloman (2002) argues that 
parallel processing of information through diffuse associative links (intuitive bias, 
regulated by associonistic or unconscious forces), where appropriate information is 
rejected or ignored, often conflicts with deliberate and sequential manipulation of 
internal representations, through a rule governed system (conscious computer logic), 
thus making decisions more difficult for the decision maker.   
Zajonc and Markus (1982) conclude that in situations that involve uncertainty or 
ambiguity, one information format normally attains a higher value leading it to carry a 
greater weighting in many judgement tasks.  This heuristical factor may have significant 
relevance in hotel yield management, where decisions are often based on numerical 
projections and forecasts, thus creating the possibility that decision makers may give a 
greater weighting or trust to specific data in order to justify their decision, or become 
blinded by the “halo effect” of leadership and past successes or failures when it comes to 
team support for particular decisions.   
Conversely, rule based systems (if-then scenarios) create a large set of propositions in 
which rule based language is encoded into a signifier and signified model of operation 
that gives decision-making a logical structure.  Here, the “correct” application of the 
rules is determined by the relations among symbols, rather than through any meaning 
that we attribute to the symbols (Sloman, 2002).   
 5 
 
Evans and Over (1996) suggest that these two systems of thinking are driven by 
different forms of rationality.  Associative behaviour is concerned with the achievement 
of one’s goals, whereas rule-based behaviour connects with ensuring that one’s 
conclusions are sanctioned by a normative theory.  Sloman (2002) argues that when a 
response is produced by an associative system, we are conscious only of the result of the 
computation and not the process, (indicating the presence of unconscious or automatic 
behaviour), whereas we are aware of both the result and the process in a rule-based 
computation (Sloman 2002).  Sloman proposes that in situations where computer data 
gives an alternative and more justifiable solution to an initial intuitive feeling, 
individuals may chose to reject the computer solution because they are fed up with being 
dictated to (rule aversion behaviour). 
 
The conundrum, therefore, faced by hotels is how to maximise revenue while at the 
same time offering a product, which is competitively priced and satisfies price-sensitive 
customers.  If, as suggested, revenue maximisation is a key success factor for a hotel, it 
would appear that optimised revenue management decisions, capable of being made in a 
rational-normative way by the use of technology assisted rule-based systems, would 
accentuate this requirement.  However, in contrasting the power of decisions that are 
intuitively compelling against those that are probabilistically correct, Tversky and 
Kahnemen’s Conjunction Fallacy Theory (1983) argues strongly that judgment related 
to “similarity” and “representitiveness” is stronger than logical argument, strongly 
linking it with the compulsive behaviour argument proposed by Arnaud (2002), and the 
Inclusion Fallacy Theory proposed by Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez and Shafir 
(1990), which propose that compelling logical arguments often fail to erase an even 
more compelling intuition.   
 
 
The Management Science Model of Decision Making 
The management science model of decision-making is closely aligned with the 
rational/normative model of decision-making and incorporates the additional capability 
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of speedily and accurately solving problems that have too many explicit variables for 
human processing (Burgess and Bryant, 2001; Rosenfeld and Wilson, 1999; Kimes, 
1989).  As yield management is predicated on large volumes of programmed decisions 
taken in an environment of temporal uncertainty, and is further complicated by attempts 
to correlate price setting, room capacity management and market segmentation, 
(Yeoman and Ingold, 2000), the management science decision model may offer the 
perfect solution to revenue optimisation. 
 
As the inherent mathematical algorithm in the management science model may contain 
many variables, each one relevant in some way to the ultimate outcome, this process is 
viewed by Rosenfeld and Wilson (1999), as encoding arguments and rationalisations in a 
very precise and predictable form, usually through a set of sequential decision steps.  
This suggests that the management science decision model, in utilising statistical 
analysis from multiple relevant data reports, will either make the decision (a dynamic 
model), or alternatively offer the best option for selection by the decision maker (a semi-
static decision support model).   
 
Ongoing advances in computing capabilities have further extended the potential 
capabilities of the management science toolkit (Bohan and Dillane, 2001; Burgess and 
Bryant; 2001; Clark and Scott, 1999), by minimising the risk involved in successfully 
forecasting “probability”.  The real value of the management science model, therefore, 
lies in its ability to extract decision pathways from a maze of uncertainty that is 
increasingly being attributed to information overload, while facilitating objective, cost-
benefit analysis of suggested options.  This suggests that the availability of user friendly 
technology should have propelled decision-making from an intuitive model, with a 
greater emphasis on human intervention (Gore 1995), to a more rational model that 
improves decision making effectiveness through the elimination of guesswork (Marakas 
2003).   
In advancing the case for management science solutions to problems of forecasting, 
Wright (2000) illustrates how quickly scenarios can change, evidenced by the growing 
requirement for customer relationship management.  Here, the pull coming from ever 
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demanding and proactive customers, and the push from increasingly sophisticated 
technology coupled with increasing globalisation, make predictable futures more and 
more unlikely, thus forcing organisations to gather and process increasing amounts of 
customer data within narrower market segments.   
 
Moreover, while accurate forecasting enhances an organisation’s performance, 
inaccurate forecasting can seriously debilitate an organisation wherein practitioner bias 
may become a factor impacting negatively on the accuracy of forecasts (Shefrin, 2007; 
Sanchez and Satir, 2005; Herbig et al, 1993).  Here, it is argued, that the use of 
management science techniques that include scenario analysis, and the interpretation and 
assignment of judgement probabilities, would constitute an effective tool in 
counterbalancing the negative effects of bias and elaborate rationalisations that are often 
embedded in forecasting.  In supporting this viewpoint, Wisniewski (1997) proposes that 
information overload, caused by a combination of the increasing pace of competition 
and continual improvements in telecommunications, strains the information capacity of 
managers, and ultimately diminishes their ability to assess, analyse or react to problems 
or opportunities.   
 
Applications of technology assisted decision evolution are common in research 
literature.  Lewis and Shoemaker (1997) suggest that technology systems have addressed 
the issue of consumer price sensitivity, thus removing the uncertainty of gut feeling or 
trial and error from the decision process.  While modern software packages greatly 
improve capacity management decisions through negating the tendency to disregard 
information which may be critical to the decision-making process (Orkin 1998).   
However, research also illustrates that there are potential downsides to the use of 
information technology as a decision-making tool.  Donaghy, McMahon-Beattie and 
McDowell (1997) suggest that the hospitality industry has been slow to adapt, citing the 
unavailability of integrated software and the requirement for “multiple technologies” as 
creating a bias against using technology.  In addition, the perception of a “loss of 
control” is identified by Carroll and Siguaw (2003) as militating against the acceptance 
of technology in the decision-making process.  The authors argue that the global shift to 
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increased numbers of distribution channels, with their complex interconnectivities, can 
create the feeling of a loss of control on the part of the decision maker and that this in 
turn creates a mental block against utilising the technology in the decision process.   
 
An alternative view, argued by Davis and Olsen (1985), proposes that although 
structured programmable decisions can be completely automated, provided the requisite 
information to apply the decision rule is available, human review is generally considered 
necessary.  This decision mindset is supported by Colville and McCauley (1996), who 
posit the case for “ontological security”, (a need to “believe in the data”), in decisions 
relating to financial risk and uncertainty.  The above divergence of opinion immediately 
suggests a conflict between the desire to optimise decisions and the degree of trust in 
systems that can execute these decisions.   
Furthermore, Glazer (1992) argues strongly that the mere presence of additional 
information may have dysfunctional consequences, even where decision makers process 
the information correctly.  This “local rationality” phenomenon suggests that although 
decision makers may focus on “chunks of information” that assist in the delivery of a 
pattern recognised decision, the presence of “additional information” will have a 
seductive or distracting effect, leading managers to consider alternative decision-making 
components.  This practice ultimately results in poorer decisions if these additional 
components are not those most closely related to success.   
 
 
Heuristics and Biases 
Heuristics are generally defined as pattern recognitions or rules of thumb that become 
useful and effective when providing hard-pressed managers with simple ways of dealing 
with complex decisions (Tversky and Kahneman 1973, 1974).  However, despite their 
efficacy, a key drawback of their usage involves individuals being frequently unaware 
that they are dependent on them.   
This dependence links the perceived benefits of heuristic usage to the potentially 
destructive forces of bias, and may in turn result in decision makers making 
systematically biased errors, where human actions in serving egotistical ends enable 
 9 
rational choice to fall prey to an individualistic bias (Shefrin, 2007; Bazerman, 2004; 
Wrong, 1994).   
 
Furthermore, an inability or unwillingness to learn from mistakes can seduce the 
decision maker into psychological traps.  This behavioural trait promotes repetitious 
behaviour by limiting the search for solutions and consolidates an already existing fear 
of moving away from the tangible, to the unknown (Nutt 2002).  What makes these traps 
so dangerous is their “invisibility.”  Within this “invisibility” behavioural catalysts force 
decision makers to take a defensive posture by collecting information that “justifies” the 
decision that they have already taken (McKenna and Martin-Smith, 2005; Hammond, 
Keeney, and Raiffa 1999).  What makes Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973, 1974) theories 
significant and radical is that they apply human behaviour in the guise of heuristics and 
biases to judgement and decision-making under conditions of uncertainty.  Their work 
skilfully integrates the causal relationships between statistical prediction, subjective 
probability and both the positive and negative significance of rules of thumb in decision-
making. 
 
In their seminal paper on Prospect Theory (1979), Kahneman and Tversky’s findings 
counter traditional assumptions of economic theory.  Their theory proposes that ordinary 
people make rational choices based on individual self-interest, evidenced when they 
frequently fail to fully analyse situations in which they must make complex judgements.  
Thus, rather than economists making their decisions in a logical, unemotional manner, 
the authors found that decisions were often based on factors such as “fairness,” 
“vividness of past events,” how the problem was “numerically framed” or the 
individual’s “aversion to loss.”  These behavioural influences on the decision process 
have been more recently cited (Shefrin, 2007; Carberry and Garavan, 2003; Colville and 
McAulay,1996), as factors relevant to the possible sub-optimisation of revenue 
generation. 
Judgemental heuristics have traditionally been classified under three main headings, 
namely, the availability heuristic, the anchoring and adjustment heuristic and the 
representativeness heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974).  More recent 
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research into heuristics and biases (Rozin and Nemeroff, 2002; Sloman, 2002; Slovic, 
Finnucane, Peters and MacGregor, 2002), has focussed on the influence of “emotion,” 
“feelings” and “automaticity” on the decision process.   
 
The availability heuristic depicts the tendency to judge the likelihood of an occurrence 
on the basis of the extent to which other like instances or occurrences can be recalled 
(Shefrin, 2007; Bartol and Martin, 1998).  As a result, decision makers when 
experiencing “difficulty” in extracting diagnostic information from the signs and signals 
attracting their attention, become prone to using information that is both vivid and 
readily available, while overlooking information that may be more diagnostic (Nutt, 
2002).  Tversky and Kahneman (1973) propose that decision makers often assess the 
frequency, probability or likely causes of an event by the degree to which instances or 
occurrences of that event are already “available” in the memory.   
While this “vividness” can make the availability heuristic a valuable tool in yield 
management decision-making, it can also be fallible, through being affected by factors 
unrelated to the objective frequency of the judged event, such as when the mind 
subconsciously blocks out undesired information which is “vivid” for all the wrong 
reasons (Hellier, Power and Sinclair, 2005; Bazerman, 2004; Plous, 1993).  Such salient 
factors, according to Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (2001), suggest that personal 
experience of the success or failure of a decision is a significant element of the decision-
making process.   
 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic proposes that decision makers make assessments 
by starting from an initial value and subsequently adjusting this value to yield a final 
decision.  This can lead to decision makers being drawn to available information due to 
a combination of the “anchoring” of personal experience and selective perception of 
solutions (Hellier, Power and Sinclair, 2005; Bazerman, 2004; Plous, 1993).  Here, a 
common anchor impacting on forecasters is the record of past events or trends, where 
according to Yeoman et al (2000), experienced yield managers when giving their 
opinions on a forecasting option, can construct consequential anchoring of the opinions 
of other members of the yield management team.  Anchoring, therefore, may prejudice 
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thinking in that it inhibits the making of objective revenue maximising decisions.  The 
anchoring trap permits this through an over reliance on one’s first thoughts, which 
subsequently establish the terms on which a decision will be made.   
 
The representativeness heuristic is associated with a tendency to be overly influenced by 
stereotypes in making judgements about the likelihood of occurrences (Shefrin, 2007; 
Bartol and Martin, 1998).  In this decision environment, making a judgement is based on 
initial “gut feelings or traits” that correspond with previously formed stereotypes.  
Bazerman (2004) argues that judgemental deficiencies arise where individuals tend to 
rely on such strategies, in the absence of sufficient information, or when better 
information that would lead to more accurate decisions exists, but is ignored.   
However, the representativeness heuristic can alternatively lead to irrational behaviour.  
The “status quo” trap suggests that decision makers display a strong bias towards 
alternatives that perpetuate the current situation (Hammond, Keeney and Raiffa, 1999).  
The authors suggest that this pull of the status quo becomes even stronger when there are 
several alternatives, and that decision behaviour in such instances may be associated 
with subconscious impacts, including the search for the comfort zone of familiarity, 
resulting from information overload.   
Representativeness, in the form of the “evidence trap,” also leads decision makers to 
seek out information that confirms their instinct or point of view, while avoiding 
information that contradicts it.  Hammond et al (1999) suggest that there are two 
fundamental psychological forces at work here.  Firstly, our tendency to decide what we 
want to do before we figure out why we want to do it, and secondly, our tendency to be 
more engaged by things we like than by things we dislike.  This leads the decision maker 
to be drawn to information that confirms their subconscious leanings (Slovic, Finnucane, 
Peters and MacGregor, 2002).   
 
The Influence of Emotion, Feelings and Automaticity 
More recent research into the relationships between heuristics and biases focus on the 
influence of emotion, feelings and automatacity on the decision-making process. 
Sympathetic Magical Theory (Rozin and Nemeroff 2002), involves a set of biases that 
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place a significant emphasis on the individual’s own perception of what is real for them.  
This decision bias fundamentally highlights the contrast between an initial reflexive 
evaluation, strongly associated with feelings, and a more considered rational assessment.  
What is really interesting here, is that decision makers are either aware, or can be made 
aware, of the irrational aspects of these biases, but chose to ignore them.  Individuals, 
therefore, become prone to rationalising the irrational, through a conscious contradiction 
of empirical data.  This preference for the irrational state is guided and controlled by the 
power of feeling, in which their interaction with logical or rational reason is evidence of 
a conscious state being used to validate or rationalise a subconscious state.   
 
Similarly, the affect heuristic (Slovic et al 2002) suggests that “feelings” encapsulated in 
a sense of “goodness or “badness,” that equate with the positive or negative quality of a 
stimulus, can significantly drive judgement and decision-making, where avoidance of 
actions that feel harmful or negative is a very powerful influence on decision-making 
(Johnson, 2004).  In a similar context, Simon (1987) argues that the intuition of the 
emotion driven manager is very different from the intuition of the expert, the latter’s 
behaviour being the product of learning and experience, the former’s being more 
influenced by primitive urges.   
 
The affect heuristic also impacts on the perception of risk.  Alhakami and Slovic (1994) 
illustrate how risk and benefit are negatively correlated.  Their research suggests that if 
decision makers “like” a decision strategy, they are likely to judge the risks as being low 
and the benefits as being high.  However, if they “dislike” it, they tend to judge the 
opposite, (high risk and low benefit).  Within yield management, this would impact on 
the preference for human intervention in decision-making (low risk, high benefit), as 
against the use of technology in decision-making (high risk, lower benefit).  Agreement 
with this theory is found in Finnucane et al (2000), who demonstrate that where time 
pressure reduces the opportunity for analytic deliberation, the inverse relationship 
between perceived risks and benefits increased greatly.   
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Within a team environment, emotional factors, such as the “framing” of the yield 
management problem and “misuse of analogy” may also contribute to the biasing of 
decisions.  Hotel yield managers are often vulnerable to a framing effect when their 
decisions are influenced by the manner in which the setting for the decision task is 
framed.  Indeed, making a comparison with the “known,” or forcefully indicating one’s 
prior experience of the problem, often helps to remove the ambiguity of choice in the 
minds of the decision team members creating a comforting calm in the process (Brindle 
1999).   
However, despite this positive intent, endeavouring to deflect attention from the decision 
to be taken can cause the process to go astray when issues of problem framing through 
misuse of analogy shape matters.  Brindle (1999) illustrates this well when describing 
how suggestions are sometimes categorised as being “like a previous idea that failed,” or 
“that definitely worked before.” This categorisation has a substantial influence on 
decision makers through associated emotional contexts.  These emotional contexts again 
correspond with the laws of sympathetic magic (Rozin et al 2002), and Lacan’s 
identification of language as being an unconscious signifier of intent (Arnaud 2002) 
 
Problem framing through misuse of analogy is closely linked with over-confidence in 
decision-making, typically where uncertainty is a critical component of the decision-
making process.  Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) suggest that decision failure is best 
explained, not as a result of rational choices gone wrong, but more likely as a 
consequence of flawed decisions due to delusional optimism.   
To achieve a desired outcome, rationalisation of the decision choice is often achieved 
through the spinning of scenarios of success, while overlooking potential for mistakes 
and miscalculations.  This over-optimism is caused by the tendency of individuals to 
over-exaggerate their own talent, which is then amplified by a tendency to misperceive 
the cause of certain events, i.e. taking personal credit for successes while attributing 
negative outcomes to external factors (Shefrin 2007).  Indeed, where the pursuit of 
economic goals becomes an organisational aim in itself, organisational narrative and 
myth goes beyond being a sense making tool, providing members instead with an 
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emotional outlet, where fantasy prevails over reality and where spontaneous activity 
temporarily replaces regimentation (Gabriel 1991).   
 
So do yield management decision-makers gravitate towards technology based 
mathematical models, or do they fall prey to urges and comfort zones facilitated by 
heuristics and biases?  The growing justification for an unquestioned acceptance of the 
mathematical management science rational model of decision-making is finely 
counterbalanced by impeding factors that militate against its acceptance.  Accordingly, 
in a market environment imbued with uncertainty, where profit maximisation has 
become increasingly significant, it is interesting to speculate if hotels have embraced 
mathematical models of decision-making in the search for optimum revenue 
management solutions. 
 
 
Methodology 
Fifteen Dublin hotels offered to participate in the research.  Each of the hotels was 
independently graded as a four or five star hotel and had access to technology for 
assisting with, or making booking decisions.  Phenomenological interviews were carried 
out in all sites, typically lasting one hour.  Observation as a participant took place in 
three of the hotels.  All other hotels declined the request for participant observation.   
 
Methodologically, the author stands firmly within the interpretivist perspective (Burrell 
and Morgan 2000) where knowledge is seen as an emergent social process, and where 
understanding and explanation of the phenomenon of interest, comes through the 
language of the respondent.  The research asks if extenuating forces impact on the yield 
management decision-making process.  Therefore, it is not simply a case of the 
respondent describing how decisions should be made, but rather, how they feel that these 
decisions should be made.   
 
The specific methodological approach chosen employed a combination of 
phenomenology (Polkinghorne, 1999) and hermeneutic enquiry to access both the 
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conscious and subconscious elements of the research.  While broadly speaking 
phenomenology is associated with the conscious state, due to its focus on intentionality, 
hermeneutic inquiry is more appropriate in accessing the subjectivist state of the 
subconscious.   
 
It was, therefore, felt that use of phenomenological approaches would be effective in 
understanding if individuals consciously construct the decision environment to satisfy 
and placate their own subconscious urges.  Hermeneutics was considered as being 
additionally useful in collecting data that observes the underlying causes of behaviour in 
relation to the interviewees’ decision processes, thus making it a useful method of 
accessing both conscious and subconscious behaviour (Nakkula and Ravitch 1998).   
 
 
Findings and Conclusions 
The purpose of this research was to establish if decision-making in the yield 
management environment of Dublin hotels utilises a rational approach to decision 
making, or if heuristics and biasing factors significantly influence the decision-making 
process.  While acknowledging that there were some findings that were site specific, this 
paper will address two broad overarching findings that were common within 
participating hotels. 
 
The first overarching finding indicated a strong preference for greater “human 
involvement” in the yield management decision-making process.  This articulated 
preference was particularly evident when managers discussed relationships with linked 
variables, such as, information technology usage, data overload, decision autonomy and 
the requirement to evaluate data.  The data used to make decisions was invariably 
historical and was generally speaking, internally generated.  However, although there 
was a reluctance to engage in the process of verification, respondents were quick to 
indicate that they trusted the data that they chose to use, even though it was not 
validated.  This was evidenced by managers selecting specific data in order to justify 
their decision preference, thus corresponding with Yeoman et al (2000) who argue that 
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for the rational model to be successful, perfect knowledge of the alternatives needs to 
exist. It also suggests that through the need for ontological security, decision makers are 
being driven into the evidence trap (Hammond et al, 1999; Colville et al, 1996).   
 
Data overload, in the opinion of a majority of respondents, impacted on the process of 
making decisions, also leading them to engage in the selection of particular data sets to 
suit the required decision.  These findings agree with Wisniewski’s (1997) contention 
that information overload ultimately diminishes the ability of the decision maker to 
analyse or react to a problem or an opportunity.  It also aligns with both Bazerman’s 
(2004) contention, that the availability of vivid information may cause the mind to 
subconsciously block out undesired information, and with the affect heuristic (Slovic 
2002), which argues that personal experience of the success or failure of a decision is 
deemed critical factor in the decision process.   
 
The greater weighting towards the individual’s involvement in the decision-making 
process also broadly corresponded with a strongly expressed desire for decision 
autonomy and a distinct preference for decentralised decision-making over centralised 
decision-making, due in part to a belief that local knowledge lay within the gift of the 
local manager.  Thus, the management science model was not considered as being 
appropriate to decision making by a majority the respondents. 
 
Although there was an acute awareness among the majority of managers interviewed, 
that technology could facilitate the making of decisions, the same respondents chose to 
ignore this for a number of reasons, particularly, a fear of losing control within their 
decision environment, and thereby, the likelihood of personal recognition.  This finding 
corresponds with the phenomenon identified by Carroll & Siguaw (2003), who argue 
that the global shift to increased numbers of distribution channels, with their complex 
interconnectivities, can create the feeling of a loss of control on the part of the decision 
maker, and this in turn creates a mental block against utilising the technology.   
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The prospect of human oriented decision-making being replaced by a technology system 
also resulted in a tendency to question trust in technology outputs.  Indeed, an overall 
unwillingness or inability to trust technology in decision-making emerged as a universal 
theme.  Evidence of this mistrust ranged from either viewing systems as a waste of 
money, arguing that information received was only as good as what was inputted, to a 
mistrust of internet-based decision systems due to the framing bias associated with 
articulating both primary and secondary sourced evidence of systems failing to deliver 
verifiable information in “other” hotels.   
 
With regard to the application of the rational model of decision making, the findings 
suggest that systematic analysis and objective evaluation of a complete suite of options 
did not occur.  Neither did a cost-benefit analysis of the chosen options occur through 
the evaluation of the relationship between the chosen data and the resultant outcome.  
The findings thus correspond with those of Yeoman et al (2000), who argue that a cost 
benefit analysis of all available options is greatly facilitated by adapting the management 
science model of decision making.  The findings also correspond with those of Gore 
(1995), who posits that internal political factors and time pressures may mitigate against 
the acceptance and appropriateness of the rational/normative model of decision making.   
 
However, while some managers, in advocating the need for human intervention, 
described rational decision making as “cold and unfeeling,” others referred to the 
necessity to feel good about a decision.  This finding corresponds with the “feeling 
factors”, characteristic of the affect heuristic (Slovic et al, 2002) and the imputation of a 
negative evaluation to negative feelings as proposed in magical theory (Rozin et al, 
2002).  This strong disposition towards human input correlated directly with the lack of 
support for the management science decision-making model, epitomised in a constant 
and often irrational downplay of the role of information technology in optimising the 
decision-making process, despite a parallel acknowledgement of the benefits and 
superior processing power of available information systems (Rozin and Nemeroff, 2002)   
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The apparent rejection of rational decision making may additionally be attributable to 
unconscious factors such as use or misuse of analogy (Brindle, 1999), wherein a 
concerted dismissal of the rational model of decision making, particularly the 
management science model, appears to have infiltrated the mindset of the respondents 
and possibly influenced the hotel’s approach to the use of technology based decision 
models.   
 
Coincidentally, the second overarching finding was also related to a preference for 
greater human involvement in the yield or revenue management decision-making 
process. However, this “preference” was often articulated through personalised 
psychodynamic biases such as a need for applause, a need for role recognition and a 
desire for self-aggrandisement on the part of the decision maker.  The findings here 
suggest that individual feelings or emotions, both positive and negative, do indeed 
influence the revenue management decision process.  Factors associated with a 
positively or negatively disposed feeling towards the decision taken, and their 
corresponding associations with heuristics and related biases, evidenced through a need 
for the comfort of familiarity, or indeed “overconfidence”, “fear” and “anxiety” were 
evident in a number of the responses.   
 
A general consensus was that yield managers are conscious of this fact in that they use 
rules of thumb to improve the quality of the decision taken.  Pattern recognition, in terms 
of previously experienced situations, and the vividness of those experiences and 
associated data, were seen as positive influences on the decision process.  However, 
these experiential factors were advocated as support for a greater weighting on human 
intervention, indicating use of both representativeness and anchoring and adjustment 
heuristics, through satisficing, or the provision of “good enough” solutions to revenue 
maximisation problems.   
 
Equally, the time at which a decision needed to be taken and the level of pressure on the 
decision maker at that time were significant determinants of the strategy employed in 
making that decision.  While the decision environment was amiably described as 
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“chaotic”, a number of the respondents felt “a sense of enjoyment” in utilising their gut 
feeling to find an acceptable solution to problems of pricing and revenue maximisation.  
However, these findings also concur with Nutt (2002), suggesting that time pressure on 
the decision maker resulted in limiting the search for remedies, thus consolidating a fear 
articulated through respondents moving away from the tangible to the unknown.   
 
In addition, here was strong evidence of decisions being based on gut feeling that 
corresponded with previously formed stereotypes, thus aligning it with the comfort 
factor associated with reliance on historical data.  This previous experience was used in 
some cases as an analogy to justify decision behaviour.  Again, this over-dependence on 
previous experience appeared to make decision makers give disproportionate weight to 
the information available.  The findings concur with Bazerman (2004) who argues that 
judgemental deficiencies arise where individuals tend to rely on such strategies in the 
absence of sufficient information, or when better information that would lead to more 
accurate decisions exist but is ignored.   
 
The need for applause and role recognition, as a theme was widely evident, where 
respondents expressed the need to be well thought of.  This highly personalised response 
was associated through a form of overconfidence playing its own part in the decision 
making process.  This corresponded with an individualistic approach to decision making, 
where some respondents formulated decisions in terms of how they would be viewed, 
prior to attending a yield management meeting.  Indeed widespread evidence was 
apparent of respondents preferring autonomy in the decision making process.  This 
suggests that the referring to a “team approach” to decision-making is a front for the 
subliminal need for individual power roles in the decision-making process.   
 
Evidence was also apparent wherein respondents rationalised their behaviour through 
the bypassing of organisational rules, agreeing with Slovic (2002) who suggests that 
individuals perceive rules as being either unfair or leading to unnecessary additional 
work being required.  In fact, the practice of keeping “rooms up sleeves” enabled one 
participant to justify their actions by constructing and justifying outcomes as being 
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better for the hotel, while openly stating that the real reason for this practice was related 
their own “satisfaction and pride”.  These “better outcomes” were rationalised while the 
respondent simultaneously downplayed the potential outcomes if the required 
organisational protocols were followed.   
 
The overall research conclusion is that within Dublin hotels, the management science 
model of decision-making has been sidelined in favour of a decision-making approach 
that emphasises human intervention.  However, what is particularly significant is that 
those interviewed believed that technology assisted models were indeed appropriate to 
the delivery of optimum revenue generating solutions due to their greater computing 
ability, but were not willing to consider a move towards information technology systems 
making, or supporting the actual decision.  As such, the influence of bias and heuristics 
significantly impacted on the consensus to reject an expanded use of the management 
science model.  Furthermore, these factors were internally rationalised, thus becoming 
conscious and, therefore, real for those interviewed.   
 
The availability to Dublin hotels of the management science model, overlaid with 
individual yield manager’s inability and unwillingness to evaluate all available data, 
provided a perfect cover for rejecting the rational model of decision-making, while 
simultaneously providing space for advocating a disproportionate preference for human 
influence in the decision-making process, thus suggesting that associonistic behaviour is 
more significant for, and relevant to these yield or revenue management decision 
makers, than is rule based behaviour.   
 
As an evaluation of the outcomes of yield or revenue management decisions taken in the 
research sites was not carried out within this research, the determination of whether or 
not systematically biased mistakes were inherent was not possible.  However, broad 
evidence of respondents not being willing to validate or evaluate data would indicate the 
possibility of these systemically biased errors being inherent in the process.   
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